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A BABY STEP: THE STATUS OF 
SURROGACY LAW IN WISCONSIN 
FOLLOWING ROSECKY V. SCHISSEL 
Surrogacy is an ancient and rapidly expanding industry in the United 
States and abroad.  Despite this, the legal landscape governing surrogacy 
contracts remains tenuous in a majority of states—including Wisconsin.  
In 2013, the Wisconsin Supreme Court took the first step in developing 
surrogacy contract law in Wisconsin.  Absent legislative guidance, the 
court fashioned a reasonable foundation for surrogacy contracts.  
However, its decision does little to ensure that intending parents and 
surrogate mothers who enter into such agreements fully understand their 
responsibilities and have assurances that their expectations will be met.  
This Comment does not seek to argue, as many others have, the merits of 
surrogacy or the limitations the law should place on the practice.  Rather, 
it seeks to illustrate the Rosecky decision’s place within the legal 
landscape and suggest one provisions that could form a foundation for 
much needed legislative guidance. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The story is rare but not uncommon.  A couple longs to have a child, 
but as the result of illness, injury, or fate, the intending mother is unable 
to successfully carry a child.  After years of heartache, the closest of 
friends expresses a desire to help.  The hopeful parents have known the 
friend for many years.  The close friend and her husband have already 
created their family and routinely stated that they were done having 
children. 
After several months, or even years, the intending parents agree to 
allow the friend to be the surrogate mother for their child.  Although 
the parties are the closest of friends, the intending parents are not 
foolish and realize conflicts can arise.  As a result, they contact a local 
attorney to learn the best course of action; the friend does the same and 
hires her own attorney. 
The attorneys explain that surrogacy contracts are commonplace and 
the parties were wise to seek one in case disagreements should arise.  
However, the attorneys also clarify that there is no law governing such 
agreements in Wisconsin; there are no guidelines or requirements for 
the drafting of a surrogacy contract.  Despite their desire to take 
precautions, the best the attorneys can do is draft a comprehensive and 
reasonable agreement between the parties.  An agreement is drafted 
based on what other states have found to be acceptable, and after 
healthy discussions, the group settles on an agreement that outlines the 
responsibilities of all the parties and explains that the child will be 
placed with the intended parents.   
In vitro fertilization is used with the intending father providing the 
sperm and the egg provided by the surrogate mother.1  The parties are 
overjoyed when they learn the procedure was successful and that in a 
few short months the hopeful parents will finally be able to start their 
family. 
As the months go on the intending parents’ friendship with the 
surrogate mother begins to unravel.  By the time the child is born, the 
 
1.  In vitro means “outside the body.”  The process involves the application of fertility 
drugs to the egg donor and retrieval of several eggs.  An egg is then maintained in a container 
and fertilized with the sperm.  The fertilized egg develops into an embryo, which is then 
placed into the woman three to five days after fertilization.  In Vitro Fertilization (IVF), 
MEDLINEPLUS, http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/article/007279.htm (last updated 
Mar. 11, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/58Z9-MJPZ; Tests and Procedures: In Vitro 
Fertilization, MAYO CLINIC (June 27, 2013), http://www.mayoclinic.org/tests-procedures/in-vi
tro-fertilization/basics/definition/prc-20018905, archived at http://perma.cc/N857-7D3B. 
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relationship has deteriorated to the point that the once good friend no 
longer wishes to surrender the child to the intended parents.  Perhaps 
the surrogate mother no longer believed the family would be best for 
the child, or perhaps she simply could not surrender the child as she 
once believed she could.  Regardless, there is no resolution in sight and 
litigation ensues. 
The intending parents, armed with the carefully crafted agreement, 
head to court to show the judge they are the rightful parents.  However, 
the legal landscape of Wisconsin is uncharted, and the surrogate mother 
argues that such agreements are void under public policy.  Much to the 
dismay of the intended parents, the judge states he will not consider the 
agreement.  Further, though the court awards sole custody and 
placement with the intended parents, he allows for the surrogate mother 
to have the child every other weekend.  Finally, the surrogate mother 
will not be forced to terminate her parental rights—the intending 
mother cannot adopt the child as originally planned. 
Surrogacy is an age-old practice, and a rapidly expanding industry 
both in the United States and abroad.  Despite this history, the legal 
landscape of surrogacy—and more specifically surrogacy contracts—is 
far from settled.  Wisconsin, like a majority of states, had no legal 
guidelines to govern surrogacy contracts prior to 2013, when the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court ruled such agreements were generally 
enforceable.2  In Wisconsin, deep divides over the morals of surrogacy 
prevented governing legislation from being passed in the late 1980s.3  
Since that time, the issue has largely remained dormant on both the 
legislative and judicial fronts despite the fact the practice of surrogacy 
has continued to grow.4 
The disturbing result of the legislature’s failure to pass meaningful 
legislation is that parties who seek surrogacy as an alternative to 
adoption have been left unable to adequately plan in a manner to ensure 
expectations are met.  In Rosecky v. Schissel, the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court held that surrogacy contracts were valid under Wisconsin public 
policy and that such agreements should be considered in determining 
custody and placement of a child, provided that the agreement does not 
conflict with the best interests of the child.5  Though a landmark 
 
2.  Rosecky v. Schissel, 2013 WI 66, ¶ 30, 349 Wis. 2d 84, 833 N.W.2d 634. 
3.  See infra Part V. 
4.  See infra Part II. 
5.  Rosecky, 2013 WI 66, ¶ 74. 
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decision that validated surrogacy in Wisconsin, far more questions are 
left to be answered.  This Comment will argue that only through 
comprehensive legislation can families have the clarity necessary to 
effectively and reliably plan for their futures. 
This Comment will argue that ensuring family planning is too vital 
for clarity to develop via case law.  Comprehensive legislation must be 
passed to ensure that when intending parents and surrogate mothers 
enter into agreements all parties fully understand their responsibilities 
and have assurances that their expectations will be enforced by the legal 
system.  Part II of this Comment provides an overview of surrogacy 
contracts and prominent cases that highlight the competing views, which 
have led to a lack of uniformity in surrogacy laws across the United 
States.  Part III will detail the Rosecky decision and analyze the court’s 
reasoning along with Chief Justice Abrahamson’s concurrence.  Part IV 
will briefly analyze examples of legislation used in other states: first, the 
model rule of Article 8 of the Uniform Parentage Act will be examined, 
followed by California’s permissive approach to surrogacy contracts 
and, finally, Illinois’s 2004 Gestational Surrogacy Act.  Part V will 
summarize Wisconsin’s failed attempts at legislation to govern surrogacy 
contracts.  Finally, Part VI will analyze questions that remain following 
the Rosecky decision and argue that the legal landscape following the 
decision should provide ample incentive for parties on both sides of the 
surrogacy debate to press for meaningful legislation.  Part VI does not 
argue for what restrictions, if any, should be placed on surrogacy 
contracts.  Rather, the Part highlights that, regardless of the 
requirements, any surrogacy legislation should include a pre-birth 
hearing to ensure conflicts are resolved before the birth of the child. 
II. BACKGROUND OF SURROGACY CONTRACTS 
Surrogacy is not a modern concept; it has been present in human 
society as far back as the birth of Abraham’s son in the Old Testament.6  
Abraham’s first wife Sarah was unable to bear children; thus, Abraham 
took a second wife, and their resulting child, Ishmael, was raised by 
Abraham and Sarah.7  With the growth of modern medicine there has 
 
6.  Genesis 16:1–4; Paul G. Arshagouni, Be Fruitful and Multiply, by Other Means if 
Necessary: The Time Has Come to Recognize and Enforce Gestational Surrogacy Agreements, 
61 DEPAUL L. REV. 799, 799 (2012).  The Bible includes at least three examples of traditional 
surrogacy.  See Genesis 16:1–4, 16:15, 30:1–10. 
7.  See Genesis 17:18, 17:25–26. 
 2015] A BABY STEP 1733 
been an explosion in the use of surrogacy and subsequent litigation.8  
The introduction of assisted reproductive technologies (ART), most 
notably in vitro fertilization, has changed the landscape of surrogacy and 
childbirth in general.9  With millions of couples unable to have children, 
surrogacy has become an increasingly popular alternative to adoption; 
likewise, surrogacy contracts have become an increasingly important 
topic for courts and legislatures.10 
Surrogacy can be broadly divided into two categories: traditional 
surrogacy and gestational surrogacy.11  In traditional surrogacy, the 
surrogate mother provides the egg and a male provides the sperm.12  
Traditional surrogacy dates back thousands of years.  In contrast, 
gestational surrogacy is a more recent creation of medical technology: 
the egg is provided from an individual other than the surrogate 
mother.13  Therefore, in traditional surrogacy the surrogate mother has a 
genetic connection to the child; in gestational surrogacy the surrogate 
mother does not have a genetic connection.14   
Non-commercial arrangements were often created between family 
members and friends.15  The most common scenario involved a married 
couple where the wife was unable to carry a child for medical reasons.16  
Reliable statistics on these informal arrangements are nearly 
 
8.  Arshagouni, supra note 6, at 802; Amy M. Larkey, Note, Redefining Motherhood: 
Determining Legal Maternity in Gestational Surrogacy Arrangements, 51 DRAKE L. REV 605, 
609 (2003); Mark Hansen, As Surrogacy Becomes More Popular, Legal Problems Proliferate, 
A.B.A. J. (Mar. 1, 2011, 11:40 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/as_surrogac
y_becomes_more_popular_legal_problems_proliferate/, archived at http://perma.cc/VDR9-
JB2J. 
9.  Arshagouni, supra note 6, at 799–800; Sonia Bychkov Green, Interstate Intercourse: 
How Modern Assisted Reproductive Technologies Challenge The Traditional Realm of 
Conflicts of Law, 24 WIS. J.L. GENDER & SOC’Y 25, 28 (2009). 
10.  Danny R. Veilleux, Annotation, Validity and Construction of Surrogate Parenting 
Agreement, 77 A.LR. 4th 70, 74–76 (1990). 
11.  Rosecky v. Schissel, 2013 WI 66, ¶ 35, 349 Wis. 2d 84, 833 N.W.2d 634 (explaining 
that the two broad categories of surrogacy can be divided into many subcategories); 
Arshagouni, supra note 6, at 801; Larkey, supra note 8, at 609–10. 
12.  Rosecky, 2013 WI 66, ¶ 35; Arshagouni, supra note 6, at 801. 
13.  Arshagouni, supra note 6, at 801; Larkey, supra note 8, at 610–11. 
14.  Arshagouni, supra note 6, at 801. 
15.  Larkey, supra note 8, at 608; see Lisa L. Behm, Legal, Moral & International 
Perspectives on Surrogate Motherhood: The Call for a Uniform Regulatory Scheme in the 
United States, 2 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 557, 560 (1999). 
16.  Larkey, supra note 8, at 607. 
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nonexistent.17  In more recent years, as social dynamics have changed, 
surrogacy has become increasingly popular for same-sex couples and 
single individuals.18 
The first formal surrogacy contract was drafted in 1976, and the first 
successful birth as a result of in vitro fertilization occurred in 1978.19  
Not surprisingly, a commercial market for surrogacy, in particular 
gestational surrogacy, developed and grew rapidly on the heels of these 
advances.20  From 1976 to 1981, an estimated 100 children were born 
under situations where a surrogacy contract was used.21  From 1981 to 
1986, that number grew to over 500 children.22  Current statistics 
estimate between 1,500 and 2,000 children are born every year under 
surrogacy and surrogacy contract arrangements.23  Likewise, surrogacy 
contracts grew in prominence to protect parties and solidify 
expectations in both commercial and informal surrogacy arrangements.24 
Surrogacy contracts typically included provisions that required the 
surrogate mother to terminate her parental rights, provided that the 
intended parents would assume legal custody over the child, and 
 
17.  MAGDALINA GUGUCHEVA, COUNCIL FOR RESPONSIBLE GENETICS, SURROGACY 
IN AMERICA 6 (2010), http://www.councilforresponsiblegenetics.org/pagedocuments/kaevej0a
1m.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/Z6YJ-32KY. 
18.  MARTHA A. FIELD, SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD 6 (expanded ed. 1990); Larkey, 
supra note 8, at 608. 
19.  FIELD, supra note 18, at 5; George J. Annas, Fairy Tales Surrogate Mothers Tell, in 
SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD: POLITICS AND PRIVACY 43, 44 (Larry Gostin ed., 1990); 
Lawrence Van Gelder, Noel Keane, 58, Lawyer in Surrogate Mother Cases, Is Dead, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 28, 1997, at B8. 
20.  Larkey, supra note 8, at 608; see HELENA RAGONÉ, SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD: 
CONCEPTION IN THE HEART 1–31 (1994) (discussing the growth of the surrogacy agency 
industry from 1976 to 1994). 
21.  FIELD, supra note 18, at 5. 
22.  Id. 
23.  Rosmarie Tong, Surrogate Parenting, INTERNET ENCYC. PHIL., http://www.iep.utm.
edu/surr-par/ (last visited Jan. 11, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/WX7K-D7KB; Lorraine 
Ali, The Curious Lives of Surrogates, NEWSWEEK (Mar. 29 2008, 10:55 AM), http://www.news
week.com/curious-lives-surrogates-84469, archived at http://perma.cc/T99Q-2CGE.  Accurate 
statistics are almost impossible to compile because of a lack of reporting standards.  Tong, 
supra.  The Society for Assisted Reproductive Technology attempts to keep yearly totals, but 
clinics are not obligated to report surrogacy births.  Ali, supra.  Though figures vary, the 1,500 
to 2,000 estimate appears consistent with the American Society of Reproductive Medicine, 
which reported 1,593 gestational surrogacy births in 2011.  Joan Cary, Surrogate Births 
Growing in Popularity, CHI. TRIB. (Oct. 9, 2013), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2013-10-
09/health/ct-x-1009-surrogate-20131009_1_illinois-gestational-surrogacy-act-egg-options-shirl
ey-zager, archived at http://perma.cc/D2FH-ZBAM.  
24.  Larkey, supra note 8, at 608.   
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clarified the rights and obligations of both parties.25  By-and-large, such 
provisions have remained common in surrogacy contracts.26  
Commercial surrogacy also involved payments from the intended 
parents to the surrogate mother for her services.27  With the exception of 
the moral debate over surrogacy and ART generally,28 payments to 
surrogate mothers have become the most heavily debated area of 
surrogacy.29 
Payments to surrogate mothers have typically centered on living 
expenses, medical expenses, and life insurance coverage.30  Commercial 
surrogacy has developed into a booming industry in the United States 
and internationally;31 numerous companies have also developed to 
 
25.  Id.  Though such provisions are common, there are nearly endless variations that 
could be included in such contracts.  See FIELD, supra note 18, at 6. 
26.  See, e.g., Rosecky v. Schissel, 2013 WI 66, ¶ 10 n.2, 349 Wis. 2d 84, 833 N.W.2d 634 
(explaining provisions included in surrogacy contract). 
27.  Every state has a ban on “baby-selling,” and any compensation provided in 
surrogacy contracts may not be in exchange for the child.  FIELD, supra note 18, at 17.  In 
states that allow commercial surrogacy, any compensation paid to the surrogate mother 
beyond reimbursement for various expenses is framed as compensation “for services,” such as 
“use of the mother’s womb.”  Id. at 17–18; SCOTT B. RAE, THE ETHICS OF COMMERCIAL 
SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD: BRAVE NEW FAMILIES? 30 (1994). 
28.  There are, of course, additional questions that arise in the surrogacy context—such 
as if either party may terminate a pregnancy.  See, e.g., Elizabeth Cohen, Surrogate Offered 
$10,000 to Abort Baby, CNN (March 6, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/03/04/health/surrogac
y-kelley-legal-battle/, archived at http://perma.cc/PJ5C-3HYN.  I do not wish to downplay the 
significance of additional questions that arise in surrogacy, but they are not the focus of this 
Comment.  Rather, such difficulties appear to highlight the need for more effective surrogacy 
contracts.  
29.  Hugh V. McLachlan & J. Kim Swales, Commercial Surrogate Motherhood and the 
Alleged Commodification of Children: A Defense of Legally Enforceable Contracts, 72 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 91, 96 (2009); see FIELD, supra note 18, at 25–45 (discussing general 
debate over ART and exploitation of women); RAE, supra note 27, at 29–76 (evaluating 
common arguments for and against commercial surrogacy).  
30.  Larkey, supra note 8, at 608.  Some studies comparing “for profit” compensation 
and compensation for “reasonable expenses” have suggested that there may be very little 
difference in the actual amounts received by the surrogate mother.  Yukari Semba et al., 
Surrogacy: Donor Conception Regulation in Japan, 24 BIOETHICS 348, 355 (2010) (comparing 
for profit surrogacy in the United States with compensation paid for “reasonable expenses” in 
the United Kingdom). 
31.  Nita Bhalla & Mansi Thapliyal, As Surrogacy Industry Booms; India Seeks Controls, 
NBC NEWS (Sep. 30, 2013, 5:14 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/business/surrogacy-industry-
booms-india-seeks-controls-8C11300035, archived at http://perma.cc/5L27-MC6U; Himanshi 
Dhawann, Unregulated Surrogacy Industry Worth over $2bn Thrives Without Legal 
Framework,  TIMES INDIA  (July 18, 2013, 2:29 AM), http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.co
m/2013-07-18/india/40656818_1_commissioning-parents-surrogate-mother-17-lakh, archived at 
http://perma.cc/F24X-VUXT; Emily Shire, The Newest Chinese Luxury Item: American 
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connect surrogate mothers with intending parents.32  Surrogacy agencies 
typically charge between $30,000 and $45,000 for a child, with the 
surrogate mother receiving between $10,000 and $15,000 plus 
expenses.33  The total costs of a surrogacy birth can double the charges.  
A recent case from Tennessee noted the intending parents paid $42,000 
in medical expenses and another $31,000 to the surrogate mother.34  
Some states allow for commercial surrogacy; others allow only non-
commercial surrogacy; and a handful of states have responded by 
banning or penalizing such practices;35 however, the lack of uniformity 
from state to state allows agencies and potential parents to freely 
operate in permissive states.36  It is not uncommon for parties from 
 
Surrogate Mothers, THE WEEK (Sep. 24, 2013), http://theweek.com/article/index/250052/the-
newest-chinese-luxury-item-american-surrogate-mothers, archived at http://perma.cc/S9EA-
Y2GH; see GUGUCHEVA, supra note 17, at 7 (explaining Center for Disease Control statistics 
on clinics performing ART procedures). 
32.  For example, The Surrogacy Center, a surrogacy agency located in Madison 
Wisconsin, was formed in 2002 and has assisted with over 100 surrogacy births.  Welcome, 
SURROGACY CTR., http://www.surrogacycenter.com/ (last visited June 15, 2015), archived at 
http://perma.cc/NXP2-WRZT. 
33.  Bryn Williams-Jones, Commercial Surrogacy and the Redefinition of Motherhood, 
2 J. PHIL. SCI. & L. (2002), http://jpsl.org/archives/commercial-surrogacy-and-redefinition-mo
therhood/, archived at http://perma.cc/L2TH-53X8; see GUGUCHEVA, supra note 17, at 26.  
Compensation for surrogate mothers varies greatly depending on experience, age, medical 
conditions, and medical procedures used.  See, e.g., Surrogate Mother Compensation, 
FERTILITY SOURCE COS., http://www.fertilitysourcecompanies.com/surrogacy/surrogate-
mother-compensation/ (last visited June 15, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/XQH3-3423. 
34.  In re Baby, 447 S.W.3d 807, 815 (Tenn. 2014).  The In re Baby case is also notable 
because it followed Wisconsin’s Rosecky decision and adopted a very similar approach.  Id. at 
831. 
35.  Arizona and the District of Columbia ban surrogacy contracts.  ARIZ. REV. STAT 
ANN. § 25-218 (2007); D.C. CODE §§ 16-401–02 (2012).  Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, and 
Nebraska void surrogacy contracts.  IND. CODE ANN. § 31-20-1-2 (LexisNexis 2013); KY. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.590(4) (LexisNexis 2013); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2713 (2005); NEB. 
REV. STAT § 25-21,200 (2008).  Michigan and New York void and penalize surrogacy 
contracts.  MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 722.851 to .861 (West 2011); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW 
§§ 121–24 (Consol. 2009). 
36.  For example, North Dakota voids traditional surrogacy contracts but allows 
gestational surrogacy.  N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-18-05, 14-20-62 (2009).  Washington allows 
surrogacy contracts but bans commercial surrogacy contracts.  WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 
§§ 26.26.220 to .240 (West 2005 & Supp. 2014).  Numerous other states allow and regulate 
surrogacy contracts in various forms.  FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 63.212–.213 (West 2012 & Supp. 
2013); id. §§ 742.15–.16 (West 2010); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 47/25 (West 2009); N.H. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:13 (2002); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 160.754 to .762 (West 2008); 
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78B-15-801 to -809 (LexisNexis 2012); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-159 to -
165 (2008 & Supp. 2012).  See generally Darra L. Hofman, “Mama’s Baby, Daddy’s Maybe:” A 
State-By-State Survey of Surrogacy Laws and Their Disparate Gender Impact, 35 WM. 
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different states to meet in a third state in order to execute a surrogacy 
contract.37 
A. Early Cases 
In 1988, surrogacy contracts burst onto the legal landscape via the 
Baby M case decided by the New Jersey Supreme Court.38  The case 
gained nationwide attention as it climbed through the New Jersey 
courts.39  Baby M was so prevalent it even sparked a “made-for-
television” movie and “tell-all book.”40  Baby M involved William and 
Elizabeth Stern contracting with Mary Whitehead to serve as a 
surrogate mother.41  The parties used traditional surrogacy with the 
genetics of the child provided by Mr. Stern and Ms. Whitehead.42  
Following the birth, Ms. Whitehead refused to turn the child over to the 
Sterns.43 
The New Jersey Supreme Court held that the surrogacy contract was 
in violation of New Jersey statutes and in violation of public policy.44  
The court viewed the contract as an attempt to circumvent existing 
statutes on adoption.45  Specifically, the court held that the surrogacy 
contract violated New Jersey’s prohibition against paying or accepting 
 
MITCHELL L. REV. 449 (2009) (surveying the large variety of approaches states have used to 
address surrogacy contracts). 
37.  See Katherine Drabiak, Carole Wegner, Valita Fredland & Paul R. Heft, Ethics, 
Law, and Commercial Surrogacy: A Call for Uniformity, 35 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 300, 300 
(2007).  As an example, a New Jersey man hired a lawyer to draft a surrogacy contract with a 
South Carolina woman.  Id.  The parties met in Indiana to execute the agreement.  Id. 
38.  Hansen, supra note 8. 
39.  See, e.g., Iver Peterson, Baby M’s Future, N.Y. TIMES, April 5, 1987, at A1.  
40.  MARY BETH WHITEHEAD & LORETTA SCHWARTZ-NOBEL, A MOTHER’S STORY: 
THE TRUTH ABOUT THE BABY M CASE (1989); Baby M (ABC Circle Films television movie 
May 22, 1988). 
41.  In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1236 (N.J. 1988).  The Sterns had sought a child for 
many years through adoption.  Id.  The parties ultimately were connected thorough the 
Infertility Center of New York.  Id. 
42.  Id. at 1235. 
43.  Id. at 1236–37.  Mrs. Whitehead initially followed through with the arrangement but 
fell into a deep depression shortly after turning over the child to the Sterns.  Id. at 1237.  
Believing Whitehead would again return the child, the Sterns allowed her to take Baby M.  
Id. 
44.  Id. at 1240.  The New Jersey Supreme Court specifically looked to New Jersey 
Statutes sections 9:2-16, 9:2-17, 9:3-41, and 30:4C-23, which govern termination of parental 
rights and voluntary surrender of a child.  Id. at 1242. 
45.  Id. at 1246–47; Arshagouni, supra note 6, at 803–04. 
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money in connection with an adoption.46  The court explained that the 
same public policy concerns over “baby-buying” that had prompted the 
state’s ban on paying or receiving money for adoption applied to 
surrogacy contracts.47 
The court’s public policy concerns also revolved around the 
exchange of money for surrogacy.48  The court noted Ms. Whitehead 
had not been represented by counsel and characterized a mother’s 
signing of a surrogacy contract prior to an understanding of the bond 
she will have with her child as “[not] totally voluntary” or “informed.”49  
New Jersey’s long history of respecting the right to contract did not 
mean such activities were beyond regulation or prohibition.50  The court 
ultimately concluded that surrogacy contracts mandated separation of 
the child from the mother, produced a form of adoption regardless of 
the suitability of the intended parents, and completely ignored the best 
interests of the child.51 
Just five years after the Baby M case, the California Supreme Court 
reached an opposite conclusion in Johnson v. Calvert.52  The divergent 
opinions between the two courts have ultimately foreshadowed the 
variety of approaches that have developed within the United States to 
address surrogacy.  Johnson v. Calvert involved gestational surrogacy: 
the Calverts provided the sperm and egg and Johnson served as the 
surrogate mother for payment of $10,000.53  The parties ultimately had a 
falling out that resulted in Johnson demanding the remaining payments 
or she would not terminate her parental rights.54  The subsequent 
lawsuits resulted in both parties seeking to be declared the legal 
parents.55 
 
46.  Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1240; see N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-54 (1985). 
47.  Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1248. 
48.  Id. at 1249–50. 
49.  Id. at 1248. 
50.  Id. at 1249 (“There are, in a civilized society, some things that money cannot buy.”) 
51.  Id. at 1250.  The New Jersey Supreme Court explained that surrogacy contracts 
were a recent creation and “[t]he long-term effects of surrogacy contracts are not known, but 
feared.”  Id. 
52.  851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993). 
53.  Id. at 778. 
54.  Id.  The disagreement between the parties was twofold.  The Calverts were 
disgruntled that Johnson had failed to disclose she had suffered several stillbirths, and 
Johnson argued the Calverts had not done enough to obtain the agreed-upon insurance 
policy.  Id. 
55.  Id. 
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The California Supreme Court began by noting that both the act of 
physically giving birth and blood tests showing genetic relation were 
acceptable forms of proving maternity under California law.56  Because 
both parties had presented acceptable proof of maternity, the court 
turned to the intentions of the parties in order to determine the parental 
rights of the child.57  The court was clear that the agreement between the 
parties was for Johnson to carry and relinquish the child to the Calverts 
after the birth.58  It emphasized that, although all three parties were 
necessary for the child to be born, the Calverts were the “prime 
movers[] of the procreative relationship,” and it was their intent that 
brought about the child.59 
Unlike in Baby M, the court ruled that gestational surrogacy differed 
significantly from adoption and, thus, adoption statutes did not provide 
an adequate framework for the court’s decision.60  The court found that 
surrogacy contracts were not contrary to public policy because 
“[h]onoring the plans and expectations of adults who will be responsible 
for a child’s welfare is likely to correlate significantly with positive 
outcomes for parents and children alike.”61 
 
56.  Id. at 781. 
57.  Id. at 782.  Under California Civil Code sections 7003, 7004, and 7015, proof of being 
a birthmother and blood tests were both sufficient evidence to prove maternity.  Id. at 781.  
However California law only allowed for one “natural” mother despite the ability for conflict.  
Id.  Former sections 7003, 7004, and 7015 were updated in 1992 and 1993.  Act of July 26, 
1993, ch. 219, sec. 63, 1993 Cal. Stat. 1576, 1579; Act of July 11, 1992, ch. 162, sec. 4, 1992 Cal. 
Stat. 463, 464. 
58.  Id. at 782. 
59.  Id. (quoting John Lawrence Hill, What Does It Mean to Be a “Parent”? The Claims 
of Biology as the Basis for Parental Rights, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 415 (1991)) (internal 
quotation mark omitted).  The “intent test” or “intent as a major factor” has remained 
California’s approach to surrogacy contracts and has been adopted elsewhere.  See In re 
Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 282, 291 (Ct. App. 1998) (upholding intending 
parents as lawful parents of child despite the fact they had no genetic connection to the child); 
Raftopol v. Ramey, 12 A.3d 783, 793 (Conn. 2011) (finding intent and valid surrogacy 
agreement was sufficient to allow for parentage rights even absent adoption); McDonald v. 
McDonald, 608 N.Y.S.2d 477, 479–80 (App. Div. 1994) (relying heavily on intent based 
approach of California Supreme Court).  This approach has not gone without criticism.  See 
Belsito v. Clark, 644 N.E.2d 760, 766–67 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1994) (rejecting an intent-based 
approach and finding lawful parents in a gestational surrogacy arrangement to be those that 
provided the genetic material of the child). 
60.  Johnson, 851 P.2d at 784. 
61.  Id. at 783 (alteration in original) (quoting Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Reproductive 
Technology and Intent-Based Parenthood: An Opportunity for Gender Neutrality, 1990 WIS. 
L. REV. 297, 397) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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The court was careful to articulate that any possible “evils” that 
could arise from surrogacy arrangements were not present in this case 
and noted that the legislature should be the proper avenue to address 
such concerns.62  It also sidestepped a clause in the agreement that 
would have allowed the Calverts to terminate the pregnancy.63  The 
court was not persuaded by Johnson’s argument that surrogacy 
contracts would exploit lower income women and treat children as 
commodities.64  The court reasoned, “The argument that a woman 
cannot knowingly and intelligently agree to gestate and a deliver a baby 
for intending parents carries overtones of the reasoning that for 
centuries prevented women from attaining equal economic rights and 
professional status . . . .”65  California’s approach has commonly been 
called the “intent test” for surrogacy contracts in that the intent of the 
parties was the major factor in the court’s determination of parentage.66 
III. ROSECKY V. SCHISSEL 
Despite the increasing use of surrogacy contracts, it took over 
twenty years for the question over the use of such agreements to reach 
Wisconsin’s highest court.  In January 2013, the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court first addressed the enforceability of surrogacy contracts.67  
Though there were no governing statutes or public policy statements, 
the court had little issue finding that surrogacy contracts are enforceable 
in Wisconsin.68  The only qualification was that such contracts could not 
mandate termination of parental rights.69  The court held that, as long as 
a surrogacy contract was a valid contract and did not conflict with the 
best interests of the child, it would be enforceable.70  The difficulty for 
the court appeared to rest in how such agreements fit within the existing 
 
62.  Id. at 784–85. 
63.  Id. at 784.  The agreement specified that the Calvert’s had “sole right” to order an 
abortion of the pregnancy.  However, the agreement also states that the parties understood 
the pregnant woman “has the absolute right to abort or not abort any fetus.”  Id. 
64.  Id. 
65.  Id. at 785. 
66.  Ardis L. Campbell, Annotation, Determination of Status as Legal or Natural Parents 
in Contested Surrogacy Births, 77 A.L.R. 5th 567, 577–81 (2000). 
67.  Rosecky v. Schissel, 2013 WI 66, 349 Wis. 2d 84, 833 N.W.2d 634. 
68.  Id. ¶¶ 40, 74. 
69.  Id. ¶ 65. 
70.  Id. ¶ 30. 
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statutory framework that governs legal custody and placement of a 
child.71 
A. Facts and Procedural History 
Marcia Rosecky and Monica Schissel had been good friends since 
grade school.72  They had participated in each other’s weddings, and the 
Roseckys were the godparents to the Schissels’ daughter.73  As a result 
of a medical condition, Marcia Rosecky was no longer able to have a 
biological child.74  Schissel offered to carry a child for the Roseckys.75  
The parties agreed to a traditional surrogacy where Schissel provided 
the egg and David Rosecky provided the sperm.76 
The parties each retained independent legal counsel and drafted a 
surrogacy contract—titled a “Parentage Agreement” by the parties—
which stated the parties’ intent would govern the birth of the child.77  
The surrogacy contract outlined a variety of areas for the pregnancy, 
including the medical procedure to be used, contingencies if the 
Roseckys were to pass away, requirements for Schissel’s conduct during 
the pregnancy, and, most notably, requirements for parentage, custody, 
and placement of the child.78  The agreement also included a severability 
clause.79 
 
71.  See id. ¶¶ 40–43. 
72.  Id. ¶ 5. 
73.  Id. 
74.  Id. ¶ 6. 
75.  Id. ¶ 7.  Schissel had made numerous offers to carry a child for the Roseckys in 2004 
and 2008.  Id.  She would later testify “I offered to do this. . . .  I orchestrated this whole 
thing.”  Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
76.  Id. ¶ 8.  The Roseckys refused Shissel’s offer in 2004 but ultimately agreed to a 
traditional surrogacy in 2008 after their attempts to secure an adoption failed.  Oral 
Argument at 15:30–16:05, Rosecky v. Schissel, 2013 WI 66, 349 Wis. 2d 84, 833 N.W.2d 634 
(2011AP2166) [hereinafter Rosecky Oral Arguments], available at http://www.wiseye.org/Pro
gramming/VideoArchive/EventDetail.aspx?evhdid=7000, archived at http://perma.cc/TN4Q-
784P. 
77.  Rosecky, 2013 WI 66, ¶ 8; id. ¶ 80 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring); Rosecky Oral 
Arguments, supra note 76, at 16:30–16:45. 
78.  Rosecky, 2013 WI 66, ¶ 10 n.2.  The surrogate contract was extensive, and numerous 
drafts were prepared and negotiated.  Id. ¶ 8. 
79.  Id. ¶ 10 n.2.  A comprehensive list of the provisions was provided in the full 
Rosecky opinion.  Id. 
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The Roseckys and the Schissels had a falling out shortly before the 
birth of the child, who the court identified as F.T.R.80  Schissel refused 
to terminate her parental rights in accordance with the surrogacy 
contract.81  However, Schissel did allow the Rosceckys to take F.T.R. 
home following his birth.82  The trial court ruled it was in the best 
interest of F.T.R. to remain in primary custody with the Roseckys and 
for Schissel to be granted two hours of placement per month.83  The 
circuit court ruled that the surrogacy contract was “clear and 
unambiguous,” but the court also ruled it could not terminate Schissel’s 
parental rights and refused to enforce the custody and placement 
provisions of the surrogacy contract as well.84  Without Schissel 
voluntarily relinquishing her parental rights, Marcia Rosecky was 
unable to adopt F.T.R.85 
A full custody and placement trial was later held to determine the 
long-term custody and placement of F.T.R.86  Under Wisconsin law, 
Schissel was presumed to be the mother of F.T.R., and an earlier 
hearing had adjudicated David Rosecky as the father.87  The trial was 
 
80.  Id. ¶ 12.  The Rosecky opinion describes the falling out: “It suffices to say that there 
were several events resulting in hurt feelings and lack of trust among the parties.”  Id.  The 
parties’ briefs elaborate that the tension developed as a result of the “unusual nature of 
having one’s husband father a child with one’s best friend.”  Respondent–Respondent’s Brief 
and Appendix at 2, Rosecky v. Schissel, 2013 WI 66, 349 Wis. 2d 84, 833 N.W.2d 634 
(2011AP2166), 2012 WL 6059328; Brief of Petitioner–Appellant at 4, 2013 WI 66, 349 Wis. 2d 
84, 833 N.W.2d 634 (2011AP2166), 2012 WL 5815880. 
81.  Rosecky, 2013 WI 66, ¶ 12.  Schissel’s refusal to terminate her parental rights left her 
as F.T.R’s mother under Wisconsin Statutes section 48.02(13).  Id. ¶ 37. 
82.  Id. ¶ 12. 
83.  Id. ¶ 14. 
84.  Id. ¶ 15 (internal quotation mark omitted).  A court may terminate parental rights 
of a parent upon voluntary consent of the parent.  WIS. STAT. § 48.41 (2013–2014).  Further, 
grounds for involuntary termination of parental rights are provided in section 48.415.  
Reasons for involuntary termination include abandonment, a continuing need for protection 
services, parental disability, failure to perform parental responsibilities, and more extreme 
situations, such as parenthood as a result of sexual assault, a felony committed against the 
child, or prior involuntary termination of parental rights for another child.  Id. § 48.415(1)–
(3), (6), (9)–(10). 
85.  Joanna L. Grossman, A Matter of Contract: The Wisconsin Supreme Court Rules 
Traditional Surrogacy Agreements Are Enforceable, VERDICT (Aug. 6, 2013),  http://verdict.ju
stia.com/2013/08/06/a-matter-of-contract-the-wisconsin-supreme-court-rules-traditional-surro
gacy-agreements-are-enforceable, archived at http://perma.cc/J5Q5-HSK6. 
86.  Rosecky, 2013 WI 66, ¶ 18. 
87.  Id. ¶ 13.  Absent such adjudication, Schissel’s husband would have been presumed 
to be the father of F.T.R.  WIS. STAT. § 891.40(1). 
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conducted under Wisconsin Statutes section 767.41.88  Section 767.41 
allows for a court determination of the custody and placement based on 
the “best interest[s] of the child.”89  The statute also clarifies the factors 
a court must consider in making such a determination.90  Further, the 
statute mandates that both parents should be entitled to periods of 
physical placement with the child unless “the court finds that physical 
placement with a parent would endanger the child’s physical, mental or 
emotional health.”91   
The circuit court heard testimony from the Roseckys, Schissels, two 
doctors hired by the Roseckys, one doctor hired by the Schissels, and 
F.T.R.’s guardian ad litem.92  Most notably, the circuit court stated it was 
“not going to consider [the surrogacy contract]” in its determination of 
the best interests of F.T.R.93  The circuit court awarded primary 
placement of F.T.R. to David Rosecky and an overnight placement with 
Schissel every other weekend.94   
B. Wisconsin Supreme Court’s Analysis 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court found that the surrogacy contract 
was a valid and enforceable contract under Wisconsin law as long as the 
 
88.  Rosecky, 2013 WI 66, ¶ 18. 
89.  WIS. STAT. § 767.41(2). 
90.  Id. § 767.41(5).  The summarized factors are (1) the “wishes of the child’s parents”; 
(2) the “wishes of the child,” as communicated by the guardian ad litem or the child; (3) the 
interactions between the child and the parents, siblings, and other persons who may affect the 
child; (4) the “amount . . . of time that each parent has spent with the child”; (5) the “child’s 
adjustment to the home, school, . . . and community”; (6) the age, education, and 
developmental needs of the child; (7) the mental and physical health of any child who will live 
with the child (8) the need for regular and meaningful physical placement for the child; 
(9) the “availability of public or private child care services”; (10) the cooperation and 
communication of the conflicting parties; (11) “[w]hether each party can support the other 
party’s relationship with the child”; (12) any evidence of abuse; (13) any evidence of spousal 
battery; (14) any alcohol or drug abuse (15) “reports of appropriate professionals”; and (16) 
any other factors the court determines relevant.  Id. 
91.  Id. § 767.41(4)(b). 
92.  Rosecky, 2013 WI 66, ¶¶ 17–18.  A guardian ad litem is a court-appointed attorney 
assigned to represent the interests of the minor.  WIS. STAT. § 767.407(1), (4). 
93.  Rosecky, 2013 WI 66, ¶ 23. 
94.  Id. ¶ 24.  A circuit court is authorized to determine custody and placement in a 
paternity action under Chapter 767.  WIS. STAT. § 767.41(1)(b).  The Roseckys appealed the 
case to the Wisconsin Court of Appeals.  Rosecky, 2013 WI 66, ¶ 25.  The court of appeals 
subsequently certified to the Wisconsin Supreme Court to decide the enforceability of the 
surrogacy contract.  Id. ¶ 26. 
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contract was not contrary to the best interests of the child.95  However, 
the surrogacy contract could not require a termination of parental 
rights.96  The court noted that Wisconsin law was exceptionally bare with 
regard to surrogacy contracts.97  Though a few statutes could be read to 
contemplate surrogacy-like situations, the court conceded that the 
statues provided no direct answer to the question of the validity of a 
surrogacy agreement.98  Without statutory guidance, the court explained 
it would analyze the enforceability of surrogacy contracts under basic 
principles of contract law: offer, acceptance, and consideration.99 
The court explained that Wisconsin has long recognized the freedom 
of people to contract, even in unique ways.100  Further, when a contract 
contains an invalid provision, courts accept the severability of that 
provision as long as it does not “defeat the primary purpose of the 
bargain.”101  This severability is especially respected when a severability 
clause is expressly provided in the contract.102 
The court concluded that the surrogacy contract at issue contained 
the basic provisions of a contract.103  Despite the unique nature of a 
surrogacy contract, it was “[n]onetheless . . . a contract and . . . [the 
court] conclude[d] that it [was] largely enforceable.”104  The court noted 
there was no consensus in other states regarding surrogacy contacts and 
held Wisconsin had no public policy statements that were contrary to 
the enforceability of such agreements.105  Further, the court described 
 
95.  Rosecky, 2013 WI 66, ¶ 30. 
96.  Id. ¶ 55. 
97.  Id. ¶ 40. 
98.  Id.  The court stated that Wisconsin Statutes sections 69.14(1)(h) and 891.40 at least 
contemplated scenarios with intended parents.  Id. ¶¶ 40–42.  Section 69.14(1)(h) is a 
procedural law which provides for a modification to a birth certificate if a court makes a 
determination of parental rights over a “surrogate mother.”  See id. ¶ 41; see also WIS. STAT. 
§ 69.14(1)(h).  Section 891.40 provides that a woman’s husband is the father of a child even 
when a woman is artificially inseminated from a sperm donor.  WIS. STAT. § 891.40(1). 
99.  Rosecky, 2013 WI 66, ¶ 48.  The court also noted that a surrogacy contract would 
also be subject to traditional contract defenses such as “misrepresentation, mistake, illegality, 
unconscionability, void against public policy, duress, undue influence, and incapacity.”  Id. 
¶ 57. 
100.  Id. ¶ 56. 
101.  Id. ¶ 58; see also Riley v. Leavit, 2013 WI App 9, ¶ 45, 345 Wis.2d 804, 826 N.W.2d 
389; Schara v. Thiede, 58 Wis. 2d 489, 495, 206 N.W.2d 129, 132 (1973). 
102.  Rosecky, 2013 WI 66, ¶ 58. 
103.  Id. ¶ 59. 
104.  Id. ¶ 60. 
105.  Id. ¶¶ 63–64 & n.11.  An example of a very clear public policy statement is 
expressed in the Indiana Code.  “The general assembly declares that it is against public policy 
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that a finding that surrogacy contracts were enforceable was in the best 
interests of society because 
[e]nforcement of surrogacy agreements promotes stability and 
permanence in family relationships because it allows the 
intended parents to plan for the arrival of their child, reinforces 
the expectations of all parties to the agreement, and reduces 
contentious litigation that could drag on for the first several 
years of the child’s life.106 
The only portion of the surrogacy contract that the court found 
invalid was the clause requiring Schissel to terminate her parental 
rights.107  Wisconsin Statutes section 48.415 lays the groundwork that a 
court may use for a finding of involuntary termination of parental 
rights.108  The court found that under the current statute there was no 
basis for such a termination based only on contract.109  The termination 
of parental rights clause could be severed from the contract without 
defeating the primary purpose of ensuring that the “Roseckys [would] 
be the parents of F.T.R. and [would] have custody and placement.”110  
The court closed its analysis by briefly dismissing Schissel’s argument 
that the contract was void against public policy and calling for the 
legislature to enact legislation to provide more guidance on surrogacy 
contracts.111 
C. Chief Justice Abrahamson’s Concurrence 
Chief Justice Abrahamson wrote an extensive concurrence of the 
court’s decision and was critical of the court with respect to its reliance 
on contract law.112  She stated, “Courts should not sacrifice statutes or 
 
to enforce any term of a surrogate agreement . . . .”  IND. CODE ANN. § 31-20-1-1 (LexisNexis 
2013).  Indiana law goes even further to specify that a court cannot base a best interest of the 
child determination on a surrogacy contract.  Id. § 31-20-1‐3. 
106.  Rosecky, 2013 WI 66, ¶ 61. 
107.  Id. ¶ 65. 
108.  Id; see WIS. STAT. § 48.415 (2013–2014); supra note 90. 
109.  Rosecky, 2013 WI 65, ¶ 65. 
110.  Id. ¶ 66. 
111.  Id. ¶¶ 68, 73.  During oral arguments, members of the court expressed concern 
about the ramifications a decision limited to the facts of this case would have on surrogacy 
contracts in the state.  See, e.g., Rosecky Oral Arguments, supra note 76, at 12:05–12:35.  The 
court’s decision echoed the call from the parties that the legislature would hopefully create 
guidelines to assist parties wishing to enter into surrogacy contracts.  Id. at 12:39–13:00. 
112.  Rosecky, 2013 WI 66, ¶¶ 77, 82 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring). 
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public policy considerations on the altar of freedom to contract . . . .”113  
The chief justice was careful to note that surrogacy contracts are not 
“standard run-of-the-mill contracts” and cautioned that courts should 
carefully examine such agreements for public policy considerations.114  
She particularly noted “baby-buying” and “exploitation of women” as 
severe public policy considerations that, though not presented by this 
case, are intertwined with surrogacy contracts.115 
The chief justice characterized the court’s analysis as “carefree” with 
regard to public policy considerations.116  She noted that the parties in 
this case had a very comprehensive agreement that contractually agreed 
that the best interests of F.T.R. would be served if the surrogate mother 
did not have custody and physical placement.117  The chief justice further 
cautioned that public policy considerations may not be as simple as the 
majority suggested.118  She listed a variety of issues that remained 
unanswered with the court’s broad acceptance of surrogacy contracts: 
[M]ust the agreement be in writing; should compensated 
agreements be allowed and what are the limits on compensation; 
should the availability of surrogacy be limited to married couples 
or infertile intended parents; should the age of any party be 
limited; should a spouse be required either to consent or to be 
made a party to the contract; must each individual involved be 
represented by counsel; should the State require that 
information about each individual’s legal rights be provided; 
what provisions are valid regarding who makes decisions about 
health care and termination of the pregnancy; how and when 
may the agreement be terminated; and must any party to the 
agreement be given the opportunity to change his or her mind 
before or after the birth of the child?119 
The chief justice stressed that such public policy issues must be 
paramount when contracting for a child.120 
 
113.  Id. ¶ 78.  The chief justice accused the majority’s decision of allowing “people to 
contract out of the State’s traditional, statutory oversight role in the protection of children.”  
Id. ¶ 77. 
114.  Id. ¶ 82. 
115.  Id. ¶ 98. 
116.  Id. ¶ 82. 
117.  Id. ¶ 83.  There seems little question that the parties took every reasonable 
precaution available.  See supra notes 77–79 and accompanying text. 
118.  Id. ¶ 82. 
119.  Id. ¶ 82 n.2. 
120.  See id. ¶ 84. 
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Chief Justice Abrahamson also cautioned that the court was 
overriding aspects of Wisconsin Statutes Chapter 767.121  As noted 
above, Chapter 767 lays out the relevant factors a court must consider 
when determining the best interests of the child.122  The chief justice’s 
concern laid in that the majority opinion suggested the surrogacy 
contract would determine custody and placement rather than the factors 
of Chapter 767.123  She accused the court of “placing . . . surrogacy 
contract[s] above, and to the exclusion of, all other factors the 
legislature has enumerated.”124 
The chief justice criticized the court for treating children produced 
via surrogacy differently than children born through traditional 
means.125  She cautioned that custody and placement of the child should 
be determined at the time of the court proceeding “irrespective of the 
means of reproduction, through a wider lens, with emphasis on the best 
interests of the child” as determined by the factors laid out in Wisconsin 
Statutes section 767.41(5).126  The chief justice would have directed 
lower courts to consider the surrogacy contract along with the relevant 
factors proscribed in section 767.41(5).127 
IV. LEGISLATIVE APPROACHES 
A thorough analysis of the state-by-state approach to surrogacy is 
beyond the scope of this Comment.128  However, a look at some of the 
most recent developments in surrogacy legislation can provide useful 
direction on how the Wisconsin legislature could provide much needed 
guidance for parties seeking to use surrogacy contracts. 
The United States does not have national policies directing 
surrogacy contracts.  As a result of the multitude of opinions on 
surrogacy, it is not surprising that states have taken a variety of 
approaches.  Though some states prohibit or outright criminalize 
surrogacy contracts, others have been very accepting of surrogacy 
arrangements and reproductive technologies in general.129  The difficulty 
 
121.  Id. ¶¶ 86–87. 
122.  Id. ¶ 87. 
123.  Id. ¶¶ 87–88. 
124.  Id. ¶ 119. 
125.  Id. ¶ 88. 
126.  Id. ¶ 97. 
127.  Id. ¶¶ 118, 126. 
128.  For a state-by-state survey, see Hofman, supra note 36. 
129.  See supra notes 35–36. 
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lies in that a majority of states, just like Wisconsin, still do not have 
legislation that addresses surrogacy.130 
Article 8 of the Uniform Parentage Act, as revised in 2002, provides 
a model framework.131  The comment introducing Article 8 highlights 
the differing opinions on surrogacy.132  The comment notes that the 
Commission had failed to develop uniform laws over reproductive 
technology that were accepted by the states.133  Article 8 attempts to 
provide a framework.  Most notably, Article 8 abandons the previous 
approach used by the Commission that provided two alternative 
approaches that a state could adopt: the first being a ban on gestational 
surrogacy contracts and the second allowing such agreements with 
certain conditions.134  In justifying this change, the comment preceding 
the article explains that reproductive technology has reached such a 
level that it will continue to be utilized, and such agreements between 
desiring parents and surrogate mothers will continue to be written.135  
Even if a state has banned such agreements, there remains a great 
likelihood that a state court will eventually need to make parental 
determinations as medical technology continues to advance.136 
Article 8 allows for gestational surrogacy contracts provided certain 
criteria are met.  The article requires that a court validate any surrogacy 
agreement, or it will be unenforceable.137  The process is relatively 
simple in that the parties seeking to validate such an agreement must 
petition the court, provide a copy of the agreement, and attend a 
hearing to determine the validity.138  The Article also outlines the 
criteria that a judge must consider to find a surrogacy agreement valid.  
The requirements include (1) ninety days of residency; (2) ensuring a 
 
130.  Surrogacy Laws in the United States, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL (Aug. 4, 2012), htt
p://www.jsonline.com/news/health/163772546.html, archived at http://perma.cc/RP3C-L9DD. 
131.  UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT art. 8 cmt. (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. (Supp.) 81–82 
(Supp. 2014). 
132.  Id. 
133.  Id. 
134.  Id. § 801 cmt.  Even prior to the introduction of Article 8, some courts, most 
notably California, had already interpreted provisions of the UPA to apply to surrogacy 
contracts.  Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 779 (Cal. 1993) (interpreting UPA, codified as 
California Civil Code sections 7000–7002, as applying to all parentage determinations even 
though surrogacy was not specified). 
135.  See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT art. 8 cmt. (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. (Supp.) 81–82 
(Supp. 2014). 
136.  Id. 
137.  Id. § 801(c). 
138.  See id. §§ 801–03. 
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home study inspection of the intending parent or parents; (3) ensuring 
“all parties have voluntarily entered into the agreement”; (4) verifying 
adequate healthcare provisions have been made; and, if necessary, 
(5) ensuring any compensation paid to the surrogate mother is 
reasonable.139 
Some states, such as California, allow for surrogacy contracts with 
very few requirements.  The parties must be identified; a disclosure of 
how the intending parents will cover medical expenses must be made; 
the parties must be represented by separate counsel; and the agreement 
must be executed prior to any procedures.140  If an agreements meets 
these largely procedural requirements, a court can then make a parental 
determination before or after the birth of the child.141 
Illinois also provides an example of legislation that governs 
surrogacy contracts—though with greater restrictions.  Illinois passed its 
Gestational Surrogacy Act in 2004.142  The act governs gestational 
surrogacy but remains silent on traditional surrogacy.143  The act 
provides that if the requirements are met the intended parents gain full 
custody at the time of the child’s birth.144  Under the law, a surrogate 
mother must be at least twenty-one years of age, have had at least one 
child, have completed mental health and medical health requirements, 
and have retained the required health insurance and legal counsel.145  
Gestational surrogacy contracts are presumed valid if (1) they are in 
writing, (2) they are entered into prior to any medical procedures, 
(3) the surrogate mother meets the eligibility requirements, (4) both 
parties have separate legal counsel, and (5) both parties sign a form of 
understanding in the presence of two witnesses.146 
Further, the Gestational Surrogacy Act lays out the minimum 
requirements for the surrogacy agreement.147  The agreement must 
 
139.  Id. § 803. 
140.  CAL. FAM. CODE § 7962(a)–(d) (West 2013). 
141.  Id. at § 7962(f)(2) 
142.  Act of Aug. 12, 2004, Pub. Act. No. 93-0921, 2004 Ill. Laws 3256.  The act took 
effect on January 1, 2005.  Id. at 3266; see also Nancy Ford, The New Illinois Surrogacy Act, 93 
ILL. B.J. 240, 240 (2005); Judith Graham, State Sets Standards on Surrogate Births, Legislation 
Called Most Liberal in U.S., CHI. TRIB., Jan. 2, 2005, at 1.1. 
143.  Ford, supra note 142, at 241. 
144.  750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 47/15(a) (West 2009). 
145.  Id. at 47/20(a).  The Gestational Surrogacy Act appears to be modeled heavily 
after the Uniform Parentage Act. 
146.  Id. at 47/25(b). 
147.  Id. at 47/25(c). 
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expressly require the surrogate mother to undergo the required medical 
procedure to allow her to carry the embryo.148  The surrogate mother 
must also agree to immediately surrender the child to the intended 
parent or parents immediately upon birth.149  The act also outlines that if 
the surrogate is married her spouse must agree to undertake obligations 
placed on the surrogate mother by the agreement and also agree to 
immediately surrender the child.150  Conversely, the intending parent or 
parents must expressly agree to immediately accept custody and 
responsibility for the child.151  The agreement must also specify that the 
surrogate mother may use the physician of her choosing during the 
pregnancy, provided she consults with the intended parents.152  The act 
creates a presumption that the agreement is enforceable even if the 
contract contains provisions that require the surrogate mother consent 
to certain medical procedures and evaluations, or refrain from certain 
behaviors.153  The presumption exists even if the agreement allows for 
reasonable payment to the surrogate mother for medical, professional, 
or legal expenses.154  Finally, even if the requirements of the act are not 
met, the court is still permitted to base a determination of parentage on 
the intent of the parties.155 
V. WISCONSIN’S PAST LEGISLATIVE ATTEMPTS 
One of the most immediately apparent questions that arises out of 
Rosecky is, Why has Wisconsin lagged behind in its surrogacy law?  The 
Baby M and Johnson cases were both decided over twenty years ago, 
and there is no question that the use of surrogacy has only increased 
since that time.  The call for the Wisconsin legislature to act is not a new 
concept; there have been calls for guidance for over thirty years.156  
Surrogacy contracts, and ART, have produced underdeveloped and 
 
148.  Id. at 47/25(c)(1)(i). 
149.  Id. at 47/25(c)(1)(ii) 
150.  Id. at 47/25(b)(2)(i), (c)(2). 
151.  Id. at 47/25(c)(4)(i). 
152.  Id. at 47/25(c)(3). 
153.  Id. at 47/25(d)(1)–(2). 
154.  Id. at 47/25(d)(3)–(4) 
155.  Id. at 47/25(e). 
156.  Laura M. Katers, Arguing the “Obvious” in Wisconsin: Why State Regulation of 
Assisted Reproductive Technology Has Not Come to Pass, and How It Should, 2000 WIS. L. 
REV. 441, 441–42. 
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complicated areas of the law.157  Legislators’ unwillingness to address 
surrogacy has not prevented the practice from charging forward.   
Wisconsin’s primary attempt at surrogacy legislation occurred from 
1987 to 1989.158  The attempt at governing surrogacy grew out of the 
Baby M controversy.159  Not surprisingly, several different bills were 
proposed to address surrogacy.160  The first proposed bill attempted to 
offer a balanced approach that allowed for surrogacy if statutory 
requirements were met but banned payments for profit to the surrogate 
mother.161  Similar to Illinois’s more recent Gestational Surrogacy Act, 
the proposal mandated a minimum age, prior childbirth, and medical 
and psychological evaluations.162  The proposal also would have placed 
similar requirements for agreeing to the medical procedure and 
surrendering of the child after birth.163 
A second proposed bill would have banned all surrogacy 
arrangements in the state.  The original version of the bill would have 
made any surrogacy punishable by up to nine months in prison and a 
$10,000 fine.164  A special committee was formed in 1989 to recommend 
legislation after extensive debate failed to reconcile the two conflicting 
approaches.  The special committee consisted of three state senators, six 
state representatives, and seven members of the public.165  The 
committee recommended a bill that (1) banned all commercial 
surrogacy, (2) regulated non-commercial surrogacy contracts, 
(3) criminalized non-compliance with such requirements, and (4) 
required a court validate surrogacy contracts.166  The bill mandated the 
 
157.  Id.; see Thomas J. Walsh, Wisconsin’s Undeveloped Surrogacy Law, WIS. LAW., 
Mar. 2012, at 16 (reviewing legal landscape of surrogacy in Wisconsin prior to the Resecky 
decision). 
158.  Katers, supra note 156, at 454. 
159.  Id. 
160.  Id. at 455. 
161.  Id.; RICHARD L. ROE, CHILDBEARING BY CONTRACT: ISSUES IN SURROGATE 
PARENTING, LRB-88-RB-1, at 17 (1988). 
162.  ROE, supra note 161, at 17; see also 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 47/20(a) (West 
2009). 
163.  ROE, supra note 161, at 17–18; Katers, supra note 156, at 456. 
164.  Katers, supra note 156, at 456. 
165.  Id. at 457; see LAURA ROSE, LEGISLATION ON SURROGATE PARENTING: 1989 
SENATE BILL 270, RELATING TO SURROGATE PARENTING, BIRTH CERTIFICATES AND 
MATERNITY, S. RL 89-15, at 5 (1989). 
166.  Katers, supra note 156, at 457.  The committee bill was also the first proposal in 
Wisconsin that would have mandated court pre-approval of surrogacy contracts, similar to the 
UPA and Gestational Surrogacy Act.  See id. 
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surrogate mother be at least eighteen years old and did not require any 
prior childbearing experience.167  The bulk of the bill focused on 
maternity determinations for surrogacy and other ART procedures.168 
Strangely, the committee did not mandate attorney representation 
for the parties or medical or psychological evaluations for the surrogate 
mother or intended parents.  Unlike the avenue chosen by Illinois over a 
decade later, the bill did not create strict requirements with regard to 
termination of parental rights and surrendering of the child.169  Rather 
the bill stated that custody, paternity, and abortion provisions of 
Wisconsin statutes must be strictly followed.170  The recommended bill 
garnered heavy criticism.171  When the bill was proposed in the senate, it 
was met with the same divisions that had prevented prior proposals 
from passing.172  After the two-year attempt to pass comprehensive 
legislation failed, the debate was essentially shelved until litigation 
forced a court to address the issue. 
VI. AFTER ROSECKY 
There is no doubt that the Rosecky decision is a milestone for 
surrogacy in Wisconsin.  However, Rosecky is just the beginning of what 
will surely be a long line of litigation on surrogacy contracts, albeit at a 
crawling pace.  Prior to Rosecky, the legal landscape in Wisconsin was 
simply barren on the issue; now, though we know surrogacy contracts 
are valid on their face, endless questions remain to be answered.  Only 
through legislation can proper guidance be provided so that when 
intending parents and surrogate mothers enter into agreements all 
parties fully understand their responsibilities and have assurances their 
expectations will be enforced by the legal system. 
A. Unanswered Questions 
The most glaring question that remains following the Rosecky 
decision is whether the court undervalued the public policy 
considerations as suggested by Chief Justice Abrahamson and if the 
 
167.  ROSE, supra note 165, at 11–14; Katers, supra note 156, at 457. 
168.  Katers, supra note 156, at 457–58. 
169.  Id. at 457; see ROSE, supra note 165, at 11–14. 
170.  Katers, supra note 156, at 457. 
171.  See, e.g., id. at 458; Neil D. Rosenberg, Doctors Call Surrogacy ‘Baby Selling,’ 
MILWAUKEE J., Apr 14, 1989, at 2B; Editorial, Surrogate Mother Bill Ill-Conceived, 
Unneeded, WIS. ST. J., Mar. 24, 1989, at 13A. 
172.  Katers, supra note 156, at 159. 
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public policy question is as settled as the court pronounced.  The 
majority accurately stated that Wisconsin Statutes did not answer the 
question and there was no public policy statement against 
enforcement.173  The legislative history with regard to surrogacy 
contracts shows that public policy was far from settled in Wisconsin, and 
the obvious counter argument is that there are no clear public policy 
statements that support surrogacy contracts.174  However, the debate has 
largely quieted, and the court acknowledged that the debate is anything 
but settled in the other forty-nine states.  The court made a small leap to 
quickly find surrogacy contracts are valid under public policy—but it is 
difficult to fault it for doing so.  Despite the slow crawl of the law, there 
were no contrary statements or statutes in Wisconsin law, and the use of 
surrogacy continues to grow in Wisconsin and throughout the United 
States.175 
Even with accepting the validity of surrogacy contracts, there remain 
numerous layers and questions that must be answered.  Chief Justice 
Abrahamson succinctly noted that the court’s opinion varies in its 
reading by alternating between suggesting that the “Parentage 
Agreement” in this case was not contrary to statutes or public policy and 
a broader reading that Wisconsin public policy supports surrogacy 
contracts in general.176  At its narrowest, Rosecky could merely be 
interpreted to mean that surrogacy contracts are valid for the purposes 
of determining custody in conjunction with the best interests of the 
child.  However, the decision seems to be much broader in accepting 
surrogacy contracts generally, though the limits remain unclear.177  
The Rosecky case presented the benefit of a very comprehensive and 
valid contract.  Attorneys wrote the agreement; the parties were 
separately represented; the agreement specified the best interests of the 
child; no compensation was paid; and this was a traditional surrogacy 
 
173.  Rosecky v. Shissel, 2013 WI 66, ¶ 47, 349 Wis. 2d 84, 833 N.W.2d 634. 
174.  Despite the lack of clear public policy on surrogacy contracts, Wisconsin does have 
an administrative statute that directs recording of parent information on a birth certificate for 
a child born to a surrogate mother.  WIS. STAT. § 69.14(1)(h) (2013–2014).  Though this 
acknowledges the existence of surrogacy, it appears a stretch to consider this a support of 
surrogacy contracts. 
175.  See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
176.  Rosecky, 2013 WI 66, ¶ 82 n.2 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring). 
177.  The court stated, “No Wisconsin Statute or case contains a specific statement of 
public policy contrary to the enforcement of this [Parentage Agreement].”  Id. ¶ 69 (majority 
opinion) (emphasis added). 
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situation.178  It is not difficult to see the follow-on-issues that Chief 
Justice Abrahamson warns must be considered.  The Rosecky decision 
does little to answer the question of what requirements must be met in 
order for a surrogacy contract to be valid.   
Further, this surrogacy contract dealt with issues arising out of 
custody and placement.179  Surrogacy contracts touch on numerous 
highly contentious areas such as adoption and abortion that Rosecky 
simply does not address.  Though the contractual analysis of the 
agreement is an adequate approach to begin analyzing surrogacy 
contracts, surely the unique nature of such agreements—the fact they 
govern a child’s life—must mandate additional requirements. 
The relationship between surrogacy contracts and the Chapter 767 
factors remains unsettled.  The court stated that surrogacy contracts 
were enforceable only if they were not contrary to the best interests of 
the child.180  By design Wisconsin Statutes section 767.41 considers a 
multitude of factors, not all of which would be considered equally.181  
Despite the apparent view that a surrogacy contract should be viewed as 
merely a factor, the court’s language suggests that such agreements 
could be placed above other factors and be paramount in a court’s 
consideration, provided it is not outweighed by the other best interests 
of the child factors. 
B. The Need For Legislation 
The difficulty with the Rosecky decision does not lie in its outcome.  
Determining placement and custody under the best interests of the child 
is the most appropriate avenue in place for the courts and complies with 
the current statutory framework.  However, this approach retains the 
flaw of creating too much instability for families and children.  It allows 
for months or even years of litigation to pass, as was the case in 
Rosecky,182 before determinations are made.183  The contrast is notable 
 
178.  Id. ¶¶ 8, 10. 
179.  Though the fact this was a traditional surrogacy case may have created a more 
challenging case for purposes of custody and placement, gestational surrogacy presents other 
more challenging questions. 
180.  Rosecky, 2013 WI 66, ¶ 30. 
181.  WIS. STAT. § 767.41(5) (2013–2014).  See supra note 90 for a summary of factors. 
182.  F.T.R was born on March 10, 2010.  Rosecky, 2013 WI 66, ¶ 12.  At the time of this 
writing, the circuit court entered an order in this case as recently as March 2015.  In re the 
Paternity of FTR: Court Record Events, WIS. CT. SYS. CIRCUIT CT. ACCESS, http://wcca.wico
urts.gov/courtRecordEvents.xsl;jsessionid=38C4E730DF294EB7B30B7F00DF9852A4.render
6?caseNo=2010PA000042PJ&countyNo=11&cacheId=40A015B300B043AC40A8A68DC025
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when compared to a state such as Illinois where the parties’ intent, and 
subsequent validation of the surrogacy contract, shields the families and 
children from these concerns by answering such questions long before 
the birth of the child. 
The purpose of this Comment is not to present and discuss the 
various arguments for and against surrogacy contracts or ART in 
general.  Rather, both sides of the argument must realize that the 
Rosecky decision leaves the legal landscape governing surrogacy 
contracts in a precarious position.  Past attempts at legislation, the 
diversity of approaches to surrogacy contracts, and the divisive political 
landscape all suggest passing comprehensive legislation on surrogacy 
contracts will be a difficult challenge.  However, Rosecky leaves many 
open-ended questions that should provide for common ground for all 
sides to reach a compromise. 
For those opposed to surrogacy contracts, the decision validates such 
agreements and provides no guidance on limitations.  Namely, the 
decision provides no clarity if there is any distinction between 
traditional and gestational surrogacy contracts, if commercial surrogacy 
is permitted, or what the limits on such commercial surrogacy would be.  
The common outcry of baby selling and exploitation of mothers will not 
be remedied by a failure to act.  At the very least, opponents should be 
willing to argue for requirements such as Illinois’s twenty-one years of 
age requirement or limitations on commercial surrogacy and payments 
to surrogate mothers.  Absent legislation the limits of what is acceptable 
in surrogacy contracts will continue to remain open until courts make 
individual determinations and the case law develops.   
For those who support surrogacy contracts, the decision does little to 
outline what requirements must be in place in order to ensure effective 
family planning and the enforcement of parties’ expectations.  Intending 
families should not be confronted with outcomes such as “most likely 
enforceable” or “probably” when considering family planning.  There 
should not be gray area with regard to the creation of a child.  
Advocates for surrogacy contracts should advocate for requirements 
and guidelines that assist in this vital family planning.  As the California 
Supreme Court aptly stated in Johnson v. Calvert, “[H]onoring the plans 
 
9951&recordCount=1&offset=0&linkOnlyToForm=false&sortDirection=DESC (last visited 
June 16, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/3U6G-DGDF. 
183.  See Thomas J. Walsh, Surrogacy Law Still Uncertain, WIS. LAW., Mar. 2014, at 28, 
31.  Judge Walsh concluded that, from a legal perspective, traditional surrogacy remains too 
risky in Wisconsin.  Id. at 32. 
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and expectations of adults who will be responsible for a child’s welfare is 
likely to correlate significantly with positive outcomes for parents and 
children alike.”184 
C. Pre-Birth Hearings 
Regardless of the limitations the legislature could enact on 
surrogacy, or the nature of the requirements for surrogacy contracts, all 
sides of the surrogacy debate should be willing to agree on a court 
validation requirement such as the one in place in Illinois’s Gestational 
Surrogacy Act and the Uniform Parentage Act.  With a minor addition, 
such hearings could be used to not only validate surrogacy contracts but 
also conform to existing statutory framework and ensure the best 
interests of the child are met.  Pre-birth hearings serve the critical 
purpose of resolving conflict before the child is born—surely this is in 
the best interest of the child.   
A court would first need to make a ruling on the validity of the 
surrogacy contract itself.  This validation would depend largely on the 
requirements the legislature would put in place.  For example, if the 
legislature allowed surrogacy contracts but banned payments to the 
surrogate mother beyond reasonable payments for medical and living 
expenses, a court would be charged with ensuring any payments were 
reasonable.  Regardless of the requirements that potential legislation 
would impose on surrogacy contracts, the validation requirement is 
essential for ensuring the agreement meets legal requirements, all 
parties understand their responsibilities, and all parties have clearly 
expressed their expectations.  Conversely, if the legislature chooses to 
maintain the rule that the surrogate mother could not be forced to 
terminate her parental rights—leaving open the possibility that 
visitation could be mandated—this limitation could be clearly explained 
to the intending parents so they could make an informed decision.  The 
minimal burden that validation hearings would place on the courts 
would be a small price to pay for addressing potential issues in surrogacy 
contracts before the inception of a child takes place.185 
 
184.  Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 783 (Cal. 1993) (quoting Shultz, supra note 61, at 
397) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
185.  Recent proposed legislation contemplates a similar type of hearing in the adoption 
context when the biological parent agrees to terminate his or her parental rights.  See Jason 
Stein, Foreign Adoptions Evaluated, Proposals Follow Discovery of “Re-Homing” of Cildren, 
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Dec. 26, 2014, at 3A. 
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Further, the legislature could similarly mandate a “best interests of 
the child” analysis be a portion of the pre-validation process.  An 
approach that focuses on the intent of the parties could be nested within 
the existing best interests of the child framework and would allow for 
parentage determinations to be made before the birth of the child and 
eliminate what would often be a distressing and confusing first years for 
the child.  The surrogacy agreement should be given a more prominent 
position in such an analysis—not merely become the seventeenth factor 
for a court to consider.  More often than not, the best interests of the 
child would be served by the intending parents who are going through 
exceptional lengths to have a child.  Such a hearing could incorporate a 
similar analysis as is currently used under Chapter 767 to ensure the best 
possible environment for the child. 
Though it may seem counterintuitive to determine the best interests 
of the child prior to birth, there would in reality be benefits to this 
approach.  A court-appointed examiner could evaluate the home 
environment that the intending parents have developed in the same 
manner as currently done under Chapter 767.186  By examining the 
preparation of the intending parents, the court could validate the best 
interests of the child and ensure issues were resolved prior to birth.  
Additionally, provisions could be put in place for a follow up 
examination to be conducted if a party believes some substantial change 
in circumstances is necessary.  All parties should be able to agree that 
the best interests of the child would not include lengthy litigation and 
shuffling between households.  With a small change, the current best 
interests of the child approach can be merged to include the intent of 
the parties and ensure a child is immediately placed in a stable situation 
upon birth. 
It seems unlikely that the Wisconsin legislature will suddenly spark 
an interest in surrogacy legislation, let alone pass a relatively 
comprehensive legislative package such as in Illinois.  Despite this, even 
patchwork legislation that puts layers on the Rosecky decision would be 
of benefit.  The realities of medical technology, and the patchwork of 
approaches used in other states, ensures that surrogacy is here to stay—
a failure to pass legislation will not change that fact.  Parents, surrogate 
mothers, and children should never be forced to spend the first years of 
a child’s life under the tension and confusion of extensive litigation.  
This is especially true when the parties have taken all available 
 
186.  See WIS. STAT. § 767.41. 
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precautions and the turmoil is the result of a legislature unwilling to 
clarify this growing area of the law. 
VII.CONCLUSION 
Surrogacy, and the use of surrogacy contracts, is an ever-increasing 
reality in medical practice and the law.  Unfortunately, the law in 
Wisconsin has been too slow in addressing this reality.  The Wisconsin 
Supreme Court’s decision in Rosecky v. Schissel marked the first 
substantial decision on the enforceability of surrogacy contracts.  The 
court ruled that surrogacy contracts were not contrary to Wisconsin 
public policy and were generally enforceable, provided they were not 
contrary to the best interests of the child. 
Despite this much needed clarification, the decision leaves a 
multitude of questions in place that can only be effectively addressed by 
the legislature.  The best interests of the child standard, though 
consistent with Wisconsin’s current statutory framework, does little to 
clarify either what the requirements of a surrogacy contract are or the 
limits of surrogacy in Wisconsin.  After Rosecky, the intentions and 
expectations of intending parents are still left to multi-factor judicial 
analysis.  Even more disturbing is that parentage decisions will still 
occur months or years after the child is born, resulting in conflict and 
confusion for the child.  The Wisconsin legislature should actively 
pursue surrogacy legislation that builds upon the best interest of the 
child by incorporating the intent of the parties in order to allow for a 
parentage determination before the birth of the child. 
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